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Abstract
This paper tests three possible explanations for why ﬁrms adopt job rotation: employee learn-
ing (rotation makes employees more versatile), employer learning (through rotation, employers
learnmoreaboutindividualworkers’strengths), andemployeemotivation(rotationmitigatesbore-
dom). Whereas previous studies have examined either establishment characteristics or a single
ﬁrm’s personnel records, this study merges information from a detailed survey of Danish private
sector ﬁrms with linked employer-employee panel data, allowing ﬁrm characteristics, work force
characteristics, and ﬁrms’ human resource management practices to be included as explanatory
variables. The results reject the employee motivation hypothesis, but support the employee learn-
ing and, especially, the employer learning hypotheses. Firms allocating more resources to training
were more likely to rotate workers; rotation schemes were more common in less hierarchical ﬁrms
and in ﬁrms with shorter average employee tenure; and both ﬁrm growth rates and ﬁrms’ use of
nation-wide recruitment were positively associated with rotation schemes.
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This paper tests three possible explanations for why firms adopt job rotation:
employee learning (rotation makes employees more versatile), employer learn-
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strengths), and employee motivation (rotation mitigates boredom).  Whereas
previous studies have examined either establishment characteristics or a single
firm’s personnel records, this study merges information from a detailed survey
of Danish private sector firms with linked employer-employee panel data,
allowing firm characteristics, work force characteristics, and firms’ human
resource management practices to be included as explanatory variables.  The
results reject the employee motivation hypothesis, but support the employee
learning and, especially, the employer learning hypotheses.  Firms allocating
more resources to training were more likely to rotate workers; rotation schemes
were more common in less hierarchical firms and in firms with shorter average
employee tenure; and both firm growth rates and firms’ use of nation-wide
recruitment were positively associated with rotation schemes.
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hy is it that some firms introduce job
rotation and others do not?  A grow-
ing amount of research is using representa-
tive surveys of establishments to answer this
question (Osterman 1994, 2000; Gittleman,
Horrigan, and Joyce 1998; OECD 1999).
Because their unit of analysis is the estab-
lishment, these papers usually provide little
evidence about the effect of employee char-
acteristics on the probability of adoption.
They focus on establishment characteris-
tics instead.  Analyses of job rotation based
on individual data are more unusual be-
cause they often require access to person-
nel records, which firms are rarely willing
to grant.  Moreover, those studies that are
based on personnel records typically are654 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
able to examine only one firm at a time
(Campion, Cheraskin, and Stevens 1994;
Kusunoki and Numagami 1998), which
raises the issue of whether their results are
representative.  We think that a satisfactory
test of the theories should combine a repre-
sentative sample of establishments with data
on employee characteristics.  To build such
a database, we have merged a representa-
tive survey of Danish firms with the em-
ployer-employee linked panel constructed
by Statistics Denmark, which provides data
on each employee at the sampled firms.
The resulting database is richer than most
surveys of establishments and provides more
representative evidence than do single-firm
case studies.
We concentrate on three theories of job
rotation.  The employee learning theory
claims that employees who rotate accumu-
late more human capital than other em-
ployees because they are exposed to a wider
range of experiences.  The employer learn-
ing theory is that the firm itself learns more
about its own employees if it can observe
how they perform at different jobs.  Finally,
the employee motivation theory is that job
rotation motivates employees who would
otherwise grow bored with endless repeti-
tion of the same tasks.  These theories
deliver different predictions regarding the
types of employees who are more likely to
rotate and the types of firms that are more
likely to adopt job rotation.
Theories and Empirical Implications
The employee learning argument  con-
tends that job rotation is an effective way to
develop employees’ abilities.  For example,
inter-functional job rotation helps prepare
junior employees to become top managers.
As employees move up to broader jobs, they
need to gain deeper understanding of more
aspects of business, and job rotation helps
them do so.  At lower hierarchical levels,
intra-functional rotation can be very useful
for allocative efficiency reasons:  firms ben-
efit from being able to re-allocate employ-
ees across different tasks because this en-
ables them to meet production require-
ments.  But re-allocation is too costly unless
employees have already gained experience
in different jobs.
The employer learning theory also argues
that job rotation improves job assignments,
but in a different way.  The idea is that job
rotation provides the employer with infor-
mation about the employee’s abilities.  Spe-
cifically, it enables the firm to identify which
part of an employee’s performance is due
to the employee’s general abilities, which
part to job-specific factors unrelated to the
employee (for example, the job might be
particularly difficult and performance low
for that reason), and which part to the
employee’s job-specific abilities.  This in-
formation can be used to improve promo-
tion decisions.  Ortega (2001) showed that
the relative benefits of job rotation are
greater when the firm knows less about its
employees’ abilities, and when the firm is
engaging in activities for which the returns
are a priori more uncertain.
The employee motivation argument is that
job rotation helps make work more inter-
esting.  This argument was mentioned in
the late 1970s literature on the so-called
“plateaued” employees—employees with
limited promotion prospects (see Ference,
Stoner, and Warren 1977)—and it was also
analyzed by Cosgel and Miceli (1999).
Finally, we should note that the litera-
ture highlights some human resource prac-
tices—such as work teams, quality circles,
Total Quality Management, and perfor-
mance pay—as complementary to job rota-
tion.  These practices should therefore af-
fect the decision to adopt job rotation (see
Osterman 1994; Pil and MacDuffie 1996;
and Gittleman, Horrigan, and Joyce 1998).1
1In principle, these practices can complement job
rotation in two different ways.  One possibility is that,
independently of the reasons that lead a firm to
introduce rotation (learning or motivation), these
practices reduce the costs of adoption.  For ex-
ample, it is easier to implement job rotation when
employees are already used to working in teams or
to interacting with other employees through qual-
ity circles.  Another possibility is that these prac-
tices are complementary with rotation only insofar
as they serve the same purpose as job rotation
(learning or motivation).JOB ROTATION 655
Existing Evidence
In the past decade, several authors have
provided evidence on the adoption of job
rotation practices (Osterman 1994, 2000;
Bailey 1994; Pil and MacDuffie 1996;
Gittleman, Horrigan, and Joyce 1998;
Jenkins and Florida 1999; Nordflex 1999;
Eriksson 2000).  Considerably fewer studies
have been able to test the theories.  In fact,
previous papers analyzing the decision to
introduce job rotation have not spoken to
the question of why rotation is useful, largely
because it is difficult to do so without data
on employee characteristics.
There are, however, two exceptions.
Campion, Cheraskin, and Stevens (1994)
studied job rotation inside the finance de-
partment of a large U.S. pharmaceutical
company.  They found that tenure had a
negative effect on the rate of job rotation.
In addition, they showed that employees
viewed increased knowledge as the main
benefit of rotation.  Kusunoki and
Numagami (1998) studied interfunctional
rotation of engineers in a large Japanese
company and found no statistically signifi-
cant effect of tenure on rotation.  However,
both studies found that employees who had
been involved in job rotation programs
were more likely to be promoted in the
future, which seems to be consistent with the
learning theories.  Since the two articles were
based on case studies, it is difficult to tell
whether their findings are representative of
job rotation practices throughout the
economy.  In addition, we shall argue that it
is important to have data on many firms in
order to test the theories of adoption.
Hypothesized Relationships
We now briefly describe the hypothesized
relationships between job rotation and
three sets of relevant variables.  (See Table
1 for a summary.)
Job rotation and firm characteristics. The
hierarchical structure of the firm is impor-
tant because it affects promotion prospects.
Firms with more hierarchical levels rely
more heavily on promotions than firms
with fewer levels.  Hence, the former are
less likely to have plateaued employees and,
from a motivation perspective, they should
use less rotation than the latter.  By con-
trast, from a learning perspective, firms
with more levels have a greater need to
train and select the right employees and
should therefore use more rotation (Ouchi
1981).  The age of the firm and the firm’s
employment growth rate should also be impor-
tant according to the employer learning
theory, since expanding firms are in a situ-
ation similar to that of young firms when it
Table 1.  Determinants of Adoption of Job Rotation Predicted by Three Theories.
Predicted Effects
Variable Employee Learning Employer Learning Employee Motivation
Firm Characteristics:
Number of Job Levels + + –
Firm Age 0 – 0
Firm’s Growth Rate 0 + 0
Firm Size + + +
Work Force Characteristics:
Average Tenure in the Firm – – +
Average Tenure in the Industry – 0 0
Heterogeneity of the Work Force + + 0
Other HRM Practices:
Internal or Local Recruitment 0 – 0
Training Costs Relative to Industry + 0 0656 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
comes to learning about new employees
in new jobs:  both types of firms need to
learn which tasks different employees are
best at.
Job rotation and work force characteristics.
Employees’ average tenure in the firm and
in the industry are key to testing the theo-
ries.  According to the employee learning
argument, rotation is more likely when
employees have more need to be trained.
Therefore employees with more tenure in
the firm, as well as those with previous work
experience in similar firms (firms be-
longing to the same industry, for ex-
ample), should be less likely than other
employees to rotate.  The employer learn-
ing theory, too, predicts that employees
with more tenure in the firm will be less
likely to rotate (the firm does not need to
learn about them), but, controlling for
firm tenure, it predicts that previous work
experience in the same industry will be
irrelevant.  According to the employee
motivation theory, employees with more
tenure are more likely to have motiva-
tional problems than those with less ten-
ure.  The implication is that tenure should
have a positive effect on rotation.  Previ-
ous experience in similar firms should,
in principle, have no effect on motiva-
tion.
Finally, the heterogeneity of personnel
should also play an important role, from
the employee and employer learning per-
spectives.  A firm with a more diverse
work force is more likely to benefit from
obtaining information about its employ-
ees (see Lazear 1998:473–74) and may
also have greater training needs.  Rota-
tion should be useful for both purposes.
Job rotation and other HRM practices. The
recruitment and training decisionsof the
firm should be related to the adoption of
job rotation, according to the learning
hypotheses.  The employer learning hy-
pothesis predicts that job rotation will be
more common in firms recruiting out-
side the firm itself, because in those cases
the firm has less information about the
employees being recruited.  For the same
reason, rotation should be more likely in
firms that recruit at a national level than
in firms recruiting at a local level:  at a
local level, the firm is more likely to have
trustworthy references about the new
employees.  Training should be an im-
portant variable according to the em-
ployee learning hypothesis, which pre-
dicts a positive relationship between train-
ing and job rotation.  To the extent that
high training expenses reflect high train-
ing needs, plants where the levels of on-
the-job training are high should use more
job rotation.
Controls
Other work practices, such as self-man-
aged teams, TQM, quality circles, and per-
formance-related pay systems, have been
shown to be complementary with job rota-
tion (see Osterman 1994, 2000).  We there-
fore expect these practices to have a posi-
tive effect on the adoption of job rotation.
We also expect the level of compensation
paid by the firm relative to the levels of
compensation paid by other firms in the
market to influence job rotation.  The pres-
ence of unions and firm size are important
controls, too.  Unions occasionally resist
more flexible work practices but, at times,
have also facilitated changes toward in-
creased employee involvement.  Firm size
may also have a positive or negative effect:
on the one hand, in order to operate a stable
job rotation scheme, firms must be above
a certain size; but on the other hand,
multi-tasking and flexibility seem to be
less valuable in larger establishments or
firms (see Lazear 1998:445–46, 473–74).
Finally, it is important to take into ac-
count the job levels at which job rotation
is being adopted:  the purpose and the
types of job rotation might differ at dif-
ferent levels of the hierarchy.
Testing the Theories
Methods and Data
The data used in this paper refer to
Denmark.  The institutional setting for the
adoption of job rotation schemes and other
new work organizations is the so-called
Danish model for co-operation in the laborJOB ROTATION 657
market, whereby the trade unions and em-
ployers’ federations agree to take responsi-
bility not only for wage bargaining and
wage setting, but also for regulatory issues
such as normal working hours, labor pro-
tection, and the work environment.  The
role of the government is mainly to “pay the
bill,” that is, to pay unemployment benefits
and provide training to workers who have
lost their jobs.  Thus, an important differ-
ence between the Danish model and the
models in other Nordic countries is that
the former relies much less on tripartite
cooperation.  Moreover, since the late 1980s
bargaining and cooperation have become
more decentralized and increasingly occur
at the level of the firm.  About 80% of wage
earners and 50% of private sector employ-
ers are organized in trade unions or em-
ployers’ federations.  Hence, the introduc-
tion of new work practices has in many
firms been part of the regular discussions
and cooperation between employers and
unions.
Our data were constructed by merging
information from two different sources:  a
survey directed to firms, and an employer-
employee linked panel.
The survey (see Eriksson 2000 for de-
tails) represents a unique source of infor-
mation on Danish firms’ internal labor
markets and changes therein.  In addition
to a request for some background informa-
tion about the firm, the firms were asked
about their work organization, compensa-
tion systems, recruitment, internal training
practices, and methods for evaluating their
employees, as well as about recent changes
in any of these structures and practices.
This paper makes use of the firms’ answers
to questions regarding their use of job rota-
tion schemes.2 The survey was adminis-
tered by Statistics Denmark as a mail ques-
tionnaire that was sent out in May and June
1999 to 3,150 private sector firms with more
than 20 employees.  The firms were chosen
from a random sample, stratified accord-
ing to size (as measured by the number of
full-time employees) and industry.  The
survey over-sampled large and medium-
sized firms:  it included all firms with 50
employees or more, but only 35% of firms
in the 21–49-employee range.
The response rate was 51%—relatively
high for a long and detailed questionnaire—
and there are 1,605 usable observations.
The response rates by size and industry cell
vary only slightly:  between 47% and 53%.
Concerning organization of work within
the company, the firm was asked whether it
had adopted the following work practices:
self-managed teams, job rotation,3 quality
circles, Total Quality Management,
benchmarking, and project organization.
In answering this question, the firm was
furthermore asked to distinguish between
adoption of the work practices for hourly
paid workers and for salaried employees
(including managers).
The survey also provides information
about other firm characteristics that, ac-
cording to the theories, should affect the
adoption of job rotation.  The hierarchical
structure of the firm pertains only to the
salaried employees and is measured as the
number of job levels in the firm within this
category.  This information is derived from
responses to the survey’s request for the
number of job levels for non-production
workers.  The age of the firm and the pres-
ence of unions are also derived from the
survey.  The presence of unions is proxied
by a positive answer to the question whether
the firm had signed a local wage agreement
with its workers, as this is typically the case
when there are particularly active and strong
unions in the workplace.
The questionnaire asked the firms how
much money they spent on employee train-
ing.  From the responses to this question we
2In addition, several of the explanatory variables
in our empirical analysis are constructed from the
firms’ answers to the survey questionnaire.
3Generally, interfunctional rotation is used mostly
for white-collar workers, whereas intrafunctional ro-
tation is more frequent for blue-collar workers.  The
survey, however, does not distinguish between differ-
ent types of rotation.658 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
have constructed a variable showing the
firm’s per capita training costs relative to
the average for all firms.  In the survey the
firms were also asked about the number of
hours spent on on-the-job training during
ordinary working time.  From this, a mea-
sure of corresponding relative training costs
(in terms of hours) can be constructed.
The advantage of the latter is that it is
specifically about training on-the-job,
whereas the advantage of the former is that
it is in money terms.  The two measures are
strongly correlated, and they yield similar
estimation results.  In what is presented
below, we use the relative per capita train-
ing costs variable.
Finally, the survey is also the source of
our data on the firm’s recruitment and
compensation policies.  In the survey, the
firms were asked where they recruited dif-
ferent groups of personnel.  Four different
recruitment venues are of interest here:
within the firm, within the local labor mar-
ket, within the same industry, and across all
of Denmark.  As far as compensation poli-
cies are concerned, the survey provides
information about the relative levels of com-
pensation and about the use of perfor-
mance-related pay systems.  Based on the
survey, we constructed two relative com-
pensation variables, one indicating whether
the firm paid higher salaries than its local
competitors, the other indicating whether
it paid the industry average.4 In addition,
the survey provides us with dummy vari-
ables for whether the firm implemented
one or more of three performance-related
pay systems:  team bonuses, individual bo-
nuses, and either stock sharing or stock
options.
According to the survey, how frequent
was job rotation, and which firms had
adopted it?  When had adoption taken
place?  The data show that one out of five
firms had implemented job rotation
schemes for hourly paid workers.  Consid-
erably fewer firms—about 6%—had
adopted them for their salaried employees.
About 20% of the firms had already imple-
mented job rotation schemes (for hourly
paid workers, salaried workers, or both)
before 1990 (mostly in the 1980s), 40% had
implemented them during the first half of
the 1990s, and another 40% had done so in
the latter half of that decade.  The pace of
adoption did not differ much between do-
mestic and foreign-owned firms.
The share of firms that adopted job rota-
tion schemes varies across industries and by
firm size (see Table 2).  Firms in the ser-
vices and manufacturing sectors were much
more likely than firms in other industries to
have implemented them for their hourly
paid employees.  Firms in the business and
finance sector were more likely to have
introduced them for the salaried employ-
ees.  For both categories of workers, the
share of adopters clearly increased with
firm size.
Table 3 gives some summary statistics for
the firms that responded to the survey ques-
tionnaire as well as some information
concerning their work forces.  As remarked
above, by construction, the sample firms
Table 2.  Percentage of Firms Using
Job Rotation, by Industry and Size.
Hourly




Wholesale and Retail Trade 5.7 8.6
Transportation and
  Communication 7.1 6.0
Business and Finance 3.1 13.1
Other Services 5.0 4.0







4Both are dummies created based on responses to
pertinent questions in the survey.  An alternative
source of such information is the employer-employee
linked data set.  From other work on the data, we
know that the answers to these questions in the survey
are quite accurate.JOB ROTATION 659
were, on average, larger than Danish com-
panies in general.  Also, the proportion of
female employees was considerably lower
in these private-sector firms than across the
entire Danish work force (including
Denmark’s large public sector).  Moreover,
the work force turnover rate (which will be
further explained below) was relatively high
in the sample firms; over an average year,
30% and 24.5% of hourly paid and salaried
employees, respectively, left their firms.
Seventy percent of the firms had a local
wage agreement for their hourly paid work-
ers, implying a relatively strong union pres-
ence.  As for other new work practices, we
note that about one-fourth of the firms had
self-managed teams, whereas TQM and
quality circles were clearly less common.
Table 3.  Summary Statistics.
Hourly Paid Hourly Paid Salaried Salaried
Variable Adopters Non-Adopters Adopters Non-Adopters
Established (%):
Before 1980 75.1 77.0 75.0 76.6
In the 1980s 19.6 20.0 19.0 20.0
In the 1990s 5.3 3.0 6.0 3.4
Size (Number of Employees) 184.8 70.9 238 77.2
Annual Employment Growth (%) 0.33 0.24 0.24 0.24
Number of Job Levels (%):
3–5 46.8 39.2
6+ 35.7 35.4
Training Costs Relative to Industry –1.50 –1.56 –0.58 –1.45
Local Wage Agreement (%) 87.4 70.2 8.2 7.5
Average Turnover Rate 35.8 32.8 24.0 24.0
Average Tenure in Firm (years) 5.2 4.8 5.3 5.3
Average Tenure in Industry (years) 5.5 5.4 5.7 5.7
Proportion with More Than Compulsory
  Education 78.6 81.4 84.8 81.2
Proportion Female Employees 29.6 19.1 30.2 22.3
Recruits from (%):
Within the Firm 88.6 65.4 63.1 37.4
Local Labor Market 18.4 11.8 14.3 14.1
All of Denmark 11.4 14.9 69.0 54.4
Same Industry 16.7 17.9 31.0 18.6
Work Organization (%):
Teams 37.6 18.6 57.1 24.8
TQM 11.0 2.8 28.6 7.4
Quality Circles 10.6 2.3 14.3 3.3
Pay Systems (%):
Team Bonus 29.0 16.2 13.1 6.3
Individual Bonus 9.8 7.5 46.4 29.1
Stock/Stock Options 2.9 1.3 16.7 7.1
Industry (Share in %):
Manufacturing 78.4 41.8 29.8 45.7
Construction 3.3 13.7 4.8 10.7
Wholesale and Trade 13.1 33.4 47.6 30.7
Transportation and Communication 2.4 5.5 4.7 5.4
Business and Finance 1.2 5.4 13.1 6.9
Services 1.6 0.2 0.0 0.6660 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
From the table it can be seen that firms
that had adopted job rotation for their
workers on hourly pay differed in various
ways from those that had not.  The adopt-
ing firms were slightly younger, consider-
ably larger and faster-growing, and more
likely to be in the manufacturing sector5
and to have a local wage agreement with
the trade unions.  These firms were also
more prone to recruit new personnel from
within the company or the local labor mar-
ket (or both).  Furthermore, the adopters
were much more likely to have implemented
new work practices.  Adopters had more
frequently introduced performance-related
pay systems than had non-adopters.  With
regard to work force characteristics, the
main difference is in the share of female
employees in the firms’ work forces, which
was much higher for adopters than for non-
adopters.
In the main, the firms that rotated their
salaried employees shared many character-
istics with those that rotated workers on
hourly compensation.  The only notable
differences are in relative training costs,
which were higher for adopting firms, and
recruitment from sources outside the inter-
nal or local labor markets, which was more
common among adopters.  Finally, we note
that firms with a pronouncedly flat hierar-
chy were less likely than others to have job
rotation schemes.
The other data source, the employer-em-
ployee linked panel, has been constructed by
Statistics Denmark by merging a number of
registers using the unique identification
numbers of individuals and plants (firms).
The panel contains detailed information
about all employees and their wage earn-
ings in all Danish firms during the period
1980–98, as well as economic information
about the firms since 1992.  This data source
enables us to create measures describing
the composition and other characteristics—
notably for our purposes, tenure and gen-
der—of firms’ work forces.  The employer-
employee linked panel also provides us with
information about two firm characteristics:
the size of the firm and its employment
growth rate.  The size of the firm is mea-
sured as the number of employees in the
firm and the employment growth rate is
measured as the five-year average employ-
ment growth rate from 1990 to 1995.  But
the main role of the employer-employee
linked data in our analysis is to provide
information about work force characteris-
tics, particularly tenure.
The average tenure of the firm’s work
force, defined as the average number of
years that an employee had been working
for his current employer, is computed across
all employees of the same category (hourly
paid or salaried).  Moreover, since the dis-
tribution of tenure in a firm is typically
rather skewed, and therefore the mean is
not necessarily a good measure with which
to characterize it, we also tried two alterna-
tive work force turnover measures as ex-
planatory variables:  1/2 ⋅(hires in year t +
hires in year t–1)/(number of employees in
year t), and 1/2 ⋅(hires in year t + separa-
tions in year t)/(number of employees in
yeart).  The measure we used in the estima-
tions was an average taken over the annual
observations for the period 1985–95.  How-
ever, neither of the alternative work force
turnover measures yielded results that dif-
fered from those obtained with average
tenure as the measure.
A third measure used was the share of
employees who had been employed less
than two years.  We include this variable
because learning does not occur at a con-
stant rate but is mainly concentrated in the
first years of an employment relationship,
after which it declines considerably.
All three measures mentioned above re-
fer to tenure in the firm.  An additional
measure employed is the average tenure in
industry.  This is potentially a key variable,
since it allows us to discriminate between
employer and employee learning theories.
In the latter, both previous and current
tenure matter, whereas in the former previ-
ous experience should not affect the firm’s
use of job rotation.
5Gittleman et al. (1998) also found more of the
new work practices in the manufacturing sector and
in larger firms.  U.S. wholesale and trade firms have
adopted new work practices to a considerably greater
extent than have such firms in Denmark.JOB ROTATION 661
The gender composition of the firm’s work
force is, for each of the two work force
categories, the proportion of female em-
ployees.  In order to control for differences
in skill composition, we include a variable
indicating the proportion of employees in
the relevant category with more than the
compulsory 10 years of schooling.
Besides average characteristics of the
firms’ work forces, we computed their stan-
dard deviations as measures of the heteroge-
neityof each firm’s employees.  As discussed
above, the employee and employer learn-
ing theories imply a positive effect of such
heterogeneity on job rotation.
Analysis and Results
We carried out a set of logit model esti-
mations for whether or not the firms had
adopted job rotation.  As explanatory vari-
ables we use four groups of regressors:  firm
characteristics, work force characteristics,
other HRM practices, and controls.
Separate regressions were estimated for
hourly paid and salaried workers, with and
without distinguishing by firm size (firms
with fewer or more than 100 employees).
Estimation results are shown in Table 4.
The distinction between hourly paid and
salaried employees is needed because jobs
across these two categories differ substan-
tially:  since hourly paid jobs are essentially
low-level, whereas salaried jobs are for the
most part high-level, job rotation may dif-
fer in type and purpose between hourly
paid and salaried workers.  The distinction
between small and large firms is also impor-
tant, because it is often unfeasible for rela-
tively small companies to implement stable
job rotation policies.  If there are few em-
ployees and few positions, the extent to
which employees can rotate is limited.  In
addition, smaller companies know their
employees much better, which greatly re-
duces the employer learning motive for
rotation.  In any case, the estimation ap-
proach does not constrain the results to be
different for each of the four groups; it just
allows for that possibility.  In the two first
columns of the table, we report the esti-
mates for all firms, with firm size included
as an explanatory variable.  We can see that
the probability of having job rotation
schemes increased with the number of
employees in the firm.  As we distinguish
between small and larger firms (the next
four columns of Table 4), we find, with a
few exceptions, a pattern similar to that for
all firms.  However, the estimates are more
precisely determined for the larger firms.
The number of job levels had a statisti-
cally significant effect on the rotation of
salaried employees of large firms.6 Firms
with 3–5 levels were significantly more likely
to use job rotation for their salaried em-
ployees than were firms with fewer levels.7
Moreover, the effect is in the direction
predicted by the employee and employer
learning theories:  when the number of job
levels was higher, the adoption of job rota-
tion schemes was more likely.  This is be-
cause both theories view job rotation as a
prerequisite for a worker to be promoted to
higher-level jobs.  The greater the likeli-
hood of promotion, the greater the value of
job rotation.  However, the result is con-
trary to the employee motivation theory,
according to which, if there are greater
promotion opportunities, there should be
less need for job rotation.
The variable for firm age has a positive
coefficient, but as this coefficient does not
differ from zero at a statistically significant
level, it yields little support for the em-
ployer learning hypothesis.8 On the other
hand, high-growth firms are presumably in
a situation similar to that of young firms
inasmuch as they also need to learn about
their new employees, and are hence more
likely to have implemented job rotation
6As noted before, the number of job levels refers
only to the salaried employee category.  Hence the
regressions for the hourly paid employees do not
include this variable.
7The coefficient corresponding to 6+ levels is not
statistically significant, but very few firms have so
many levels, which makes it very difficult to obtain
precise estimates.
8Note, however, that only 13.6% of the firms had
introduced rotation schemes the first year the firm
was established, and an additional 15% had done so
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Table 4.  Logit Results for the Adoption of Job Rotation.
Hourly Hourly Hourly
Paid; Salaried; Paid; Paid; Salaried; Salaried;
All All Small Larger Small Larger
Explanatory Variable Firms Firms Firms Firms Firms Firms










Established in the 1990s 0.165 0.298 0.139 0.178 0.307 0.343
(0.299) (0.664) (0.301) (0.374) (0.295) (0.578)
(0.021) (0.010) (0.019) (0.020) (0.039) (0.034)
Established in the 1980s –0.028 –0.013 0.047 –0.057 –0.011 –0.027
(0.211) (0.313) (0.219) (0.101) (0.298) (0.434)
-(0.005) (–0.001) (0.008) (–0.010) (–0.001) (–0.002)
3–5 Job Levels 0.574** 0.139 0.845***
(0.229) (0.277) (0.183)
(0.026) (0.008) (0.033)
6+ Levels 0.104 –0.019 0.154
(0.331) (0.347) (0.279)
(0.007) (–0.001) (0.010)
Local Wage Agreement 0.537*** 0.121 0.299 0.548*** 0.087 0.103
(0.194) (0.533) (0.212) (0.163) (0.445) (0.393)
(0.070) (0.006) (0.035) (0.070) (0.015) (0.006)
Wage above Local Competitors –0.104 –0.124 –0.114 –0.154 –0.125 –0.098
(0.270) (0.533) (0.315) (0.294) (0.444) (0.273)
(–0.013) (–0.007) (–0.012) (–0.016) (–0.015) (–0.011)
Wage above Industry Mean 0.099 0.427 0.087 0.079 0.379 0.275
(0.238) (0.454) (0.214) (0.188) (0.401) (0.574)
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.026) (0.024)
Training Costs Relative to 0.179*** 0.180** 0.164* 0.245*** 0.111* 0.212***
Industry (0.057) (0.087) (0.081) (0.079) (0.060) (0.065)
(0.022) (0.009) (0.056) (0.026) (0.018) (0.029)
The Firm’s Growth Rate 0.411*** 0.424*** 0.306** 0.584*** 0.311** 0.696***
(5-year avg.) in Employment (0.143) (0.138) (0.151) (0.148) (0.147) (0.127)
(0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016) (0.011) (0.017)
Average Tenure in the Firm –0.024 0.026 –0.019 –0.036** 0.028 0.014
(0.037) (0.087) (0.038) (0.018) (0.094) (0.057)
(–0.005) (0.001) (–0.003) (–0.009)  (0.004) (0.005)
Average Tenure in the Industry 0.011 0.020 0.009 0.012 0.031 –0.037
(0.049) (0.059) (0.050) (0.052) (0.067) (0.041)
(0.001) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (–0.001)
Proportion of Women 1.599*** 1.386*** 0.887*** 1.614** 1.478*** 1.596***
(0.382) (0.543) (0.332) (0.832) (0.363) (0.544)
(0.224) (0.055) (0.156) (0.217) (0.207) (0.229)
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Table 4.  Continued.
Hourly Hourly Hourly
Paid; Salaried; Paid; Paid; Salaried; Salaried;
All All Small Larger Small Larger
Explanatory Variable Firms Firms Firms Firms Firms Firms
Proportion with Education –1.393 2.012* –.0.978 –1.485 –1.856* 2.437**
> 10 Years (1.456) (1.114) (1.584) (1.937) (1.014) (1.215)
(–0.177) (0.101) (–0.144) (–0.166) (–0.165) (0.132)
Teams 0.543*** 0.811*** 0.343* 0.609*** 0.797*** 0.847***
(0.212) (0.241) (0.179) (0.214) (0.216) (0.304)
(0.133) (0.032) (0.098) (0.140) (0.149) (0.147)
TQM 0.988*** 0.927*** 0.314 1.245*** 1.434 1.613***
(0.337) (0.315) (0.4249 (0.299) (0.945) (0.679)
(0.179) (0.057) (0.060) (0.199) (0.231) (0.231)
Quality Circles 1.253*** 0.954** 0.303* 0.979*** 0.714 0.993**
(0.360) (0.448) (0.159) (0.283) (0.434) (0.393)
(0.212) (0.050) (0.055) (0.204) (0.169) (0.183)
Team Bonus Schemes 0.290 0.300 0.097 0.194 0.144 0.127
(0.222) (0.414) (0.453) (0.245) (0.241) (0.259)
(0.040) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.036) (0.020) (0.021)
Individual Bonus Schemes 0.061 0.098 0.057 0.039 0.113 0.051
(0.307) (0.354) (0.214) (0.299) (0.274) (0.265)
(0.009) (0.004) (0.008)  (0.004) (0.017) (0.003)
Stock and Stock Option Plans 0.066 0.198 0.014 0.088 0.041 0.015
(0.547) (0.653) (0.797) (0.393) (0.173) (0.191)
(0.009) (0.010) (0.002) (0.011) (0.007) (0.002)
Recruitment:
From within 0.214 0.384 0.089 –0.067 0.396 0.094
(0.143) (0.244) (0.367) (0.089) (0.445) (0.115)
(0.050) (0.015) (0.023) (–0.012) (0.059) (0.017)
Local Labor Market 0.311 –0.575 0.167 0.143 –0.274 –0.433
(0.227) (0.499) (0.305) (0.279) (0.389) (0.344)
(0.039) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (–0.034) (–0.015)
All of Denmark –0.114 0.018 –0.024 0.207 0.015 0.064*
(0.207) (0.302) (0.654) (0.156) (0.095) (0.033)
(–0.019) (0.001) (–0.004) (0.023) (0.001) (0.015)
Same Industry –0.098 0.008 –0.147 –0.037 0.043 –0.009
(0.164) (0.214) (0.212) (0.198) (0.105) (0.064)
(–0.011) (0.001) (–0.018) (–0.003) (0.005) (–0.001)
Std. Dev. of Experience of –0.357*** –0.396** –0.137 –0.456** –0.243 –0.357*
Employees (0.096) (0.123) (0.145) (0.229) (0.156) (0.189)
(–0.026) (–0.030) (–0.012) (–0.030) (–0.020) (–0.021)
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R-Squared 0.212 0.174 0.132 0.244 0.142 0.196
Log Likelihood –375.43 –221.37 –656.79 –593.17 –254.33 –497.10
Observations 1,076 1,261 347 729 427 834
Notes: Roman numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and italicized numbers in parentheses are
marginal effects (evaluated at the mean for continuous variables, and for a discrete change for the discrete
variables).  A Wald test rejected the equality of coefficients common to equations for hourly paid and salaried
workers, respectively, in all three cases.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.664 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
schemes.  This is also what we find for the
hourly paid workers, and it is consistent
with the employer learning theory.
Other aspects of the firms that were asso-
ciated with a higher likelihood of job rota-
tion were the presence of unions (for hourly
paid workers) and higher than average per
capita training costs.  The finding that firms
spending more to train their employees
were more likely to have job rotation
schemes is favorable to the employee learn-
ing hypothesis.
For average tenure in the firm, we obtain
statistically significant and negative esti-
mates for the hourly paid in large firms,
which is consistent with both the employer
and employee learning hypotheses:  firms
in which average tenure is smaller have a
greater need to train their employees (the
employee learning argument) or need to
learn more about them (the employer learn-
ing argument).9 Whereas tenure in the
firm has a statistically significant effect on
rotation, tenure in the industry does not.
This is consistent with the employer learn-
ing theory, and contradicts the employee
learning theory.
The employer learning hypothesis re-
ceives some support from the results con-
cerning the sources of new personnel re-
cruitment.  The hypothesis predicts that
firms chiefly recruiting at the national level
have a greater need to learn about their
new employees than do firms recruiting
from their own ranks or from the local
labor market.  Hence, firms with broader
recruitment strategies are more likely to
use job rotation.  Indeed, the regressions
show that for the larger firms, recruiting at
the national level has a positive effect on
the use of job rotation.  The effect of re-
cruiting internally or locally, however, is
not statistically significant.  This contra-
dicts the employer learning theory (which
predicts a negative sign) and maybe the
employee learning theory (which would
predict a positive sign if internal recruit-
ment implies better promotion opportuni-
ties for current employees).
As for other work force characteristics,
we find that the proportion of women in
the firm’s work force is positively and
strongly correlated with the probability that
the firm rotates its workers.  We are not able
to offer any obvious explanations for this
pattern.10 Tests to see if the proportion of
women was particularly high in specific
industries or was correlated with high work
force turnover showed no such patterns.
The estimates also show that the share of
workers with more than compulsory educa-
tion has relatively large marginal effects,
although the coefficients, which differ in
sign between the hourly paid and the sala-
ried employees, carry rather large standard
errors.  Contrary to the employer and em-
ployee learning hypotheses, heterogeneity
(with respect to experience, as measured
by age) is negatively related to job rotation.
This is puzzling, as one would expect that
rotating employees who possess different
sets of knowledge would be useful.
The estimations do indeed provide evi-
dence supporting the notion of
complementarity between different work
practices:  teams, quality circles, and TQM
were all positively related to the adoption
of job rotation schemes.  The fact that
rotation was more likely in firms where
teams were being used indicates that the
firms were not using the information they
learned to re-allocate tasks, since their
employees worked in teams anyway.  This
would speak against the employer learning
hypothesis.  However, a firm might use
rotation to learn the best way to assign tasks
within teams.11
We performed various tests to check the
robustness of the estimation results.  To
save space, we do not report the corre-
sponding tables.  We computed estimates
based on smaller samples, obtained by ex-
9However, the coefficient on the share of employ-
ees with less than 2 years of tenure did not differ
significantly from zero, and this variable is therefore
omitted from the logit models in Table 4.
10A suggestion offered by our female colleagues is
that the results simply confirm the hypothesis that
women are inherently more “flexible.”
11The complementarity between job rotation and
the other work practices seems to be so strong that it
is possible that the inclusion of the latter is capturingJOB ROTATION 665
cluding those firms that had implemented
rotation schemes prior to 1990.  The reason
for imposing this restriction on the data is
that most of the explanatory variables refer
to the second half of the 1990s.  With the
exception of one explanatory variable, the
exclusion of about one-fifth of the firms
leads to fairly small changes in the coeffi-
cient estimates and their standard errors.
We also tried excluding the most heteroge-
neous firms, in order to increase the repre-
sentativeness of the empirical analysis re-
sults.  Our approach was to first compute
for each firm the standard deviation of
employees’ years of education and age, and
then exclude those firms with values that
put them among the 15% in either of the
outer tails of the standard deviations distri-
butions.  The estimates from these more
homogeneous firm samples closely re-
semble those obtained from the full sample,
and their precision is affected only slightly.
The only change worth noting is the find-
ing that salaried employees were paid more
in firms that had adopted job rotation
schemes.  However, causality can go both
ways, as firms that are performing well and
hence can afford to pay higher salaries may
also have more resources for experiment-
ing with alternative ways of organizing
work.12
Conclusions
We have used data created by linking a
questionnaire on firms’ HRM and pay prac-
tices to a longitudinal matched employer-
employee data set to examine the determi-
nants of the adoption of job rotation
schemes in Danish firms.  Our analysis gives
separate treatment to hourly paid workers
and salaried employees, as well as to small
and larger firms.  Our main purpose has
been to identify which firms were imple-
menting job rotation, and to explore why
they did so.  We distinguish between three
different explanatory frameworks:  em-
ployee learning, employer learning, and
employee motivation.
We find only very limited support for the
employee motivation hypothesis.  Job rota-
tion schemes were not more likely in firms
with long-tenured employees, or in firms
with a relatively flat hierarchy and hence
only small promotion prospects.  The statis-
tical evidence is more amenable to the
employee learning hypothesis and employer
learning hypothesis.  Favoring the former
is our finding that firms that spent rela-
tively more on training were more likely to
rotate workers.  Moreover, job rotation
schemes were more common in less hierar-
chical firms and in firms with shorter aver-
age firm tenure.  These two findings also
lend support to the employer learning story.
Two findings speak against employee
learning.  One is the negative relationship
between job rotation and worker heteroge-
neity.  The opposite is predicted by the
employee learning hypothesis, which pos-
its that rotation and the information trans-
fer associated with it are more useful when
employees have differing sets of knowledge.
Another negative finding is that average
industry tenure had no statistically signifi-
cant effect, a finding consistent with the
employer learning hypothesis but at odds
with the negative relationship predicted by
employee learning theory.
On the whole, the employer learning
explanation seems most solidly supported
by the results.  Other findings consistent
with that hypothesis are that the occur-
rence of job rotation schemes was positively
associated with both firm growth rates and
nation-wide recruitment practices but not
associated with the practice of recruiting
from within the firm or within the local
labor market.
the effects of other variables “explaining” the adop-
tion of job rotation.  We therefore also estimated the
logit model without the dummies for TQM, quality
circles, and teams.  The results, which are not re-
ported, turned out to be quite close to those obtained
before; only the explanatory power of the estimated
logit model was significantly reduced.  The adoption
of job rotation does not seem to have been associated
with firms having implemented performance-related
pay schemes.
12The evidence from the small but growing litera-
ture on the benefits of new work practices is mixed.
Black and Lynch (2004) found positive wage effects,
whereas Cappelli and Neumark (2001) found only
small wage effects, and Osterman (2000) found no
effects at all.  For a recent, comprehensive review, see
Ichniowski and Shaw (2003).666 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
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